This commentary discusses several problems with the target article by Ceci et al. First, the results admit of an alternative interpretation that undercuts the conclusion drawn. In addition, at a number of points, the research should be supplemented by examining situations in which there is no tenure-granting policy. Finally, 60% of the questions are concerned with whistle-blowing, but the issues involved in such cases make them much less relevant to the assessment of tenure than the authors suppose. (Published Online February (...) 8 2007). (shrink)

Going beyond the hype of recent fMRI "findings," this interdisciplinary collection examines such questions as: Do women and men have significantly different brains? Do women empathize, while men systematize? Is there a "feminine" ethics? What does brain research on intersex conditions tell us about sex and gender?

This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If (...) there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated. (shrink)

This book is the first collection of feminist essays on one of the central figures in the history of English-speaking philosophy.

In this paper I will present three reservations about the claims made by Hutto and Satnet. First of all, though TNOC is presented as drawing on teleological theories of mental content for a conception of Ur-Intentionaltiy, what is separated out after objectionable claims are removed from teleological accounts may not retain enough to give us directed intelligence. This problem raises a question about what we need in a naturalistic basis for an account of the mental. Secondly, I think that the (...) authors’ objections to cognitive science’s supposed notion of a mental representation in fact attack a philosophers’ invention, one that sprung into vibrant being in the mid-1970’s. It is not employed in cognitive neuroscience to any significant extent and it isn’t needed by other disciplines involved in cognitive science. Finally, I worry that the account of the origin of content – namely, explanatory narrative - presents us with a too limited view of human discourse, particularly as it is needed for a social theory of mind. (shrink)

Is causation either necessary or sufficient (or both) to make a belief-desire pair the reason for which one acts? In this paper I argue in support of a negative answer to this question, and thus attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the causal theorists. I also provide an outline of a different account of reasons and rationalization. Motivating my inquiry is a concern to show that ordinary ascriptions of reasons are not hostage to future accounts of how the (...) brain works. (shrink)

This paper argues for two major revisions in the way philosophers standardly think of vision science and vision theories more generally. The first concerns mental representations and the second supervenience. The central result is that the way is cleared for an externalist theory of perception. The framework for such a theory has what are called Aristotelian representations as elements in processes the well-functioning of which is the principal object of a theory of vision.

Might we have an instinctive tendency to perform helpful actions? This paper explores a model under development in cognitive neuroscience that enables us to understand what instinctive, helpful actions might look like. The account that emerges puts some pressure on key concepts in the philosophical understanding of folk psychology. In developing the contrast, a notion of embodied beliefs is introduced; it arguably fits folk conceptions better than philosophical ones. One upshot is that Humean insights into the role of empathy and (...) instinct in the production of helpful actions are affirmed. (shrink)

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

Every epistemological theory needs to be able to articulate some version of the following principle: If S's belief "q" is to make S's belief "p" justified (or is to make "p" something S knows), then "q" must possess some positive epistemic merit. This paper argues that naturalizing epistemologies do not have access to this principle. The central problem is that of providing a naturalistic account of the notion of a reason-for-which one believes while avoiding internalist commitments. The discussion, which focuses (...) on the work of Alvin Goldman, is part of a general argument against causal accounts of reasons-for-which. (shrink)

Drawing on a wide range of resources, including the history of philosophy, her role as director of a cognitive neuroscience group, and her Wittgensteinian training at Oxford, Jacobson provides fresh views on representation, concepts, perception, action, emotion and belief.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Inductive Scepticism and Experimental Reasoning in Moral Subjects in Hume's Philosophy Anne Jaap Jacobson According to its title page, Hume's Treatise Concerning HumanNature is An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental Method ofReasoning INTO MORAL SUBJECTS."1 And from the first section onwards, Hume makes statements about the human mind which are given an unqualified generality;An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding is marked by a similar assurance that much about human (...) understanding can be known. Because of this, exegesis which attributes to Hume an unrestrained scepticism about the experimental method appears to attribute to him inconsistency on such a scale as to render the interpretation itselfquestionable. Nonetheless, there is, atleast on the face ofit, considerable justification for ascribing to Hume just such a scepticism. In this paper I explore sceptical features, some ofthem important but little noticed, in Hume's treatment of causality and our beliefs about the unobserved. Though I end by suggestinghow to avoidviewing Hume in this area as simply lamentably inconsistent, Hume's use of the experimental method doesremain problematic, as, I suggest, Hume himselfthought. The first three of the following sections in this paper treat connected themes in Hume's philosophy which, when taken together, present us with a very sceptical view of experimental reasoning. I. Necessity as projected impression Hume holds that our beliefs about causality in the objects are in large part the result of a projection of an internal impression of (some kind of) necessity. The thesis ofprojection is not entirely straightforward; to see this, let us ask the question, is the impression which is projected semantically simple or complex? There are excellentreasonsforregarding the impression as simple as Hume conceives of "simple" in this context. Hume himselfappears to sayitis simple (E 64, n. 1). Andmuch of Hume's discussion ofnecessity is driven by the principle that there can be no idea without a preceding impression, and this principle applies only to simple ideas. But the consequent reading is far from satisfactory. To see the problem, let us look at what seems to be the Volume XV Number 2 325 ANNE JAAP JACOBSON most entrenched understanding ofHume, one perhaps amark ofKemp Smith's influence. This is the view that Hume is saying that the impression source of our idea of necessity is a feeling of anticipation. The problem is this: ifa feeling ofanticipation is a simple impression, it is not at all clear that the impression can do the job Hume has for it. Remember that if the impression is in content itselfrelational, then it is not a simple impression on Hume's own account, since ideas of relations are for him complex (T 13). Hence, we might take the impression to be of the sort described by Stroud, according to whom the impression yielding our idea of necessity is semantically unrelated to the elements of the relation. But such a reading robs Hume of the explanatory position he so clearly thinks he has. If we have a semantically simple impression it becomes a mystery why the spreading has the effects that it does: when we transfer the determination ofthe thought to external objects, andsuppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them. (T 168, my emphasis) Why does spreading some simple, indefinable feeling result in our supposing there is a real intelligible connection between the objects on which the mind has spread? To get this result it looks as though the mind will have tomake two mistakes: thefirstmistake is the spreading, and the second mistake consists in the mind's inferring from the experience of the impression as spread that somehow the causal inference itself is also out there in nature as an intelligible connection. But, while Hume does sometimes seem to suggest we make this sort of two-step error (T 223, for example), such a picture makes it seem that the impression spread is not really the semantic source of (that is, wholly determinate of the content of) our idea ofnecessity. Rather, on the two-step error model, our belief that there are connections enters as a result of an inference following upon the spreading; however, for Hume, an inference is not the way an impression ofX gives rise to an idea ofX... (shrink)

Hume's "other words" which follow his first definition of causality in the "enquiry" are standardly read as giving us a counterfactual conditional. I argue that a more accurate reading reveals them to constitute a factual conditional, One reflecting a temporal restriction implicit in the first definition. The other words, So understood, Tell us merely that a component of the relation defined in the first definition is symmetrical.

In this commentary, I focus on several problems that the authors' understanding of group identity raises: the legality of avoiding background diversity, the problem of effectively unshareable knowledge, the practical quality of some outcomes arrived at by groups with homogeneous backgrounds, and moral issues about fairness. I note also that much recent research challenges the view that background diversity is more likely to be a detriment than a benefit.

Mental time travel is the ability to mentally project oneself backward in time to relive past experiences and forward in time to pre-live possible future experiences. Previous work has focused on MTT in its voluntary form. Here, we introduce the notion of involuntary MTT. We examined involuntary versus voluntary and past versus future MTT in a diary study. We found that involuntary future event representations—defined as representations of possible personal future events that come to mind with no preceding search attempts—were (...) as common as involuntary autobiographical memories and similar to them regarding cuing and subjective qualities. Future MTT involved more positive and idyllic representations than past MTT. MTT into the distant future/past involved more representations of cultural life script events than MTT into the immediate past/future. The findings are discussed in relation to cultural learning and MTT considered as a higher mental process. (shrink)

BackgroundGeneral practitioners often act as gatekeeper, authorizing patients’ access to hospital care. This gatekeeping role became even more important during the current COVID-19 crisis as uncertainties regarding COVID-19 made estimating the desirability of hospital referrals (for outpatient or inpatient hospitalization) complex, both for COVID and non-COVID suspected patients. This study explored Dutch general practitioners’ experiences and ethical dilemmas faced in decision making about hospital referrals in times of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsSemi-structured interviews with Dutch general practitioners working in the Netherlands were (...) conducted. Participants were recruited via purposive sampling. Thematic analysis was conducted using content coding.ResultsFifteen interviews were conducted, identifying four themes: one overarching regarding (1) COVID-19 uncertainties, and three themes about experienced ethical dilemmas: (2) the patients’ self-determination vs. the general practitioners’ paternalism, (3) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. the general practitioners’ autonomy rights, (4) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. adequate care provision.ConclusionsLack of knowledge about COVID-19, risks to infect loved ones, scarcity of hospital beds and loneliness of patients during hospital admission were central in dilemmas experienced. When developing guidelines for future crises, this should be taken into account. (shrink)

This book features essays that investigate the nature of legal validity from the point of view of different traditions and disciplines. Validity is a fascinating and elusive characteristic of law that in itself deserves to be explored, but further investigation is made more acute and necessary by the production, nowadays, of soft law products of regulation, such as declarations, self-regulatory codes, and standardization norms. These types of rules may not exhibit the characteristics of formal law, and may lack full formal (...) validity but yet may have a very real impact on people's lives. The essays focus on the structural properties of hard and soft legal phenomena and the basis of their validity. Some propose to redefine validity: to allow for multiple concepts instead of one and/or to allow for a gradual concept of validity. Others seek to analyze the new situation by linking it to familiar historical debates and well-established theories of law. In addition, coverage looks at the functions of validity itself. The discussion considers both international law as well as domestic law arrangements. What does it mean to say that something is valid? Should we discard validity as the determining aspect of law? If so, what does this mean for our concept of law? Should we differentiate between kinds of validity? Or, can we say that rules can be "more" or "less" valid? After reading this book, practitioners, scholars and students will have a nuanced understanding of these questions and more. Chapter 6 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com. (shrink)

This study examines high school students’ responses to a public policy discussion on the topic of Internet privacy. Specifically, students discussed the question of whether search engines and social media sites should be permitted to monitor, track, and share users’ personal data or whether such practices violate personal privacy. We observed discussions of the topic in four high school classrooms in 2015–2016, prior to the presidential election in 2016. We first explain why the topic failed to work as a controversial (...) public issue with high schoolers. We then explain their responses to the issue. We found (1) students displayed a surprising trust in Facebook and Google; (2) students framed the issue of Internet Privacy as a conflict in values and a set of trade-offs; and (3) students tended to put more weight on personal responsibility than implications for democracy in their assessment of the (acknowledged) erosion of privacy as a result of social media and Internet search engines. We conclude with implications for social studies education and teacher education. (shrink)

Introduction -- Theses and discussions -- Analytical concepts -- General approach -- Moral philosophy in antiquity -- Christian moral philosophy -- Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas -- William of Ockham -- From William of Ockham to Francisco Suarez -- Protestant natural law -- John Locke -- The American and French declarations of rights -- Early critique of the Declaration of Rights -- Immanuel Kant and modern moral philosophy -- Human rights today.

Overzicht van de ontwikkeling van het ideaal van de vrije mens in de westerse wereld.

Classical logic is based on an underlying view of the world, according to which there are elementary facts and compound facts, which are logical combinations of these elementary facts. Sentences are true if they correspond to, in last instance, the elementary facts in the world. This world view has no place for rules, which exist as individuals in the world, and which create relations between the most elementary facts. As a result, classical logic is not suitable to deal with rules, (...) and is therefore unsuitable to deal with legal reasoning. A logic that is more suitable should take into account that law is a part of social reality, in particular a part that consists of constructivist facts, and that rules play a central role in law. This article gives a superficial description of how social reality exists and of the place of law and legal rules in it. It uses this description to argue that traditional techniques to reason with and about legal rules provide a better logic for law than classical logic. These techniques can be accommodated in a logic that treats rules as logical individuals. (shrink)

It is a common mistake, especially, perhaps, among students of the religions and philosophies of India, to assume that the word prakṛti, best known as the ultimate material principle in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems of religious thought, the material cause of the world in Hindu theologies and, as such, an epithet of the goddesses in Hinduism, always refers to an ultimate principle. Even in Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts the word prakṛti is used in various ways. Prakṛti does not always (...) refer to the ultimate principle. Translators often leave the word prakṛti untranslated and mislead the reader to assume that the ultimate principle is referred to, when it is not. This article discusses the use of prakṛti in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga texts the Yogasūtra and the Vyāsabhāṣya and criticises some translation practices. (shrink)

This study investigates the methodology and tradition of Aëtius' Doxography of physics and provides a full reconstruction of Book II as a single unified text.